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The role and scope of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has 
fluctuated throughout a number of mission-based cycles since the heightened publicity 
of the Apollo era.  But throughout this history, NASA’s joint roles as the United States’ 
civilian research bastion on spaceflight and innovative public relations mission for 
American science leadership has remained unchanged.  Surrounding this culture in the 
modern era is a new and continually-emerging commercial space sector, one which has 
made for the increased efficient use of often-waning federal dollars while enabling a 
swift timeline of revolutionary space travel.  Enter the Artemis missions, originally 
developed as a NASA program to give use to the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket—the 
most powerful rocket ever built—and planned with the effort to return America’s next 
man and first woman to the moon as a next-step program for travel to deep space.  
While the original goal for this human lunar landing was 2028, the Trump administration 
in 2019 announced a call to accelerate this timeline to a 2024 landing, releasing the 
updated strategy (the “Artemis Plan”), however uncertain, a year later.  This 
memorandum outlines the importance of NASA and its space-bound missions to both 
our national economy and global image and proposes a revised Artemis timeline 
(returning to the moon in 2028) that seeks to minimize the likelihood of a very public 
failure in the unmet 2024 goal—while understanding the careful political opportunities 
presented by what may be the final “giant leap” aboard a NASA-made rocket. 
 





















“There is still in truth upon these great level plains a people, a community 
bound together by imaginative possessions, by stories and poems 
which have grown out of its own life, and by a past of great passions 
which can still waken the heart to imaginative action.” 
 
– WB Yeats 
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TO: President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 
FROM: Thomas I. Deaton 
DATE: 31 MAR 2021 
SUBJECT: The Artemis Case for Celestial Competition, With Revisions 
 
I. ACTION-FORCING EVENT 
 In September 2020, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
issued the “Artemis Plan,” a 74-page report outlining the forthcoming Artemis missions 
that intend to return humankind to the lunar surface (including the first woman to do 
so) by 2024, a fast-tracked timeline from the original 2028 goal.1 
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 At an increasing pace over the last two decades, the United States has found 
itself in a new space race with the quickly-developing Chinese space program, among 
others, creating competitive threats to both American innovation and national security.  
However, federal funding for NASA-led research and development, though bipartisan, 
maintains mostly business-as-usual spending, unable to react to the capital required of 
the vastly accelerated efforts by the previous administration to reach the Moon by 
2024.  Despite the necessity for NASA to transition to new missions in the face of an 
aging International Space Station (ISS), even the “Artemis Plan” notes that the new, 
hastened timeline for the mission remains “significantly dependent on new technology 
                                                     
1 “Artemis Plan: NASA’s Lunar Exploration Program Overview,” National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, September, 2020, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-10/55699-CBO-MBR.pdf. 
 
 2 
maturation,” which, even with increased commercialization, is not guaranteed.2  NASA 
needs Artemis, but this new timeline jeopardizes its ability to fulfill its roles as flagship 
research agency and civilian feeder of America’s next-gen military capabilities. 
 Though the US developed a Moon-bound space program nearly 40 years prior to 
China’s first orbital launch, one can assume, as Dr. Matthew Daniels presents in a report 
on the subject for the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, that human spaceflight 
will maintain a certain modern “political significance” to the two nations.3  In their own 
way, it is suggested that space capabilities will mimic the Cold War by reprising a role as 
“a measure of each side’s broader military and technological capabilities”4 and could 
potentially reemerge as a domestic indicator of success in the political arena (vis-à-vis 
Kennedy’s ‘missile gap’ of the early 1960s). 
 The United States’ own U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 
has highlighted China’s ability to pool both public support and funding to achieve “space 
power in all respects,” a combination which has enabled and will continue to enable 
China to “achieve future milestones in areas where it is lagging behind international 
standards on shorter timetables than when the United States accomplished similar 
missions.”5  And much like the US, China is exploring commercial spaceflight as a 
method to “boost efficiency,” but with a caveat: while Chinese space companies may 
                                                     
2 “Artemis Plan: NASA’s Lunar Exploration Program Overview.” 
3 Matthew Daniels, “The History and Future of US-China Competition and Cooperation in Space,” The 
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory LLC, 2020, 
https://www.jhuapl.edu/Content/documents/Daniels-Space.pdf. 
4 Daniels. 
5 Alexander Bowe, “China’s Pursuit of Space Power Status and Implications for the United States,” U.S.-




rely on private capital, they “enjoy close ties to the government” unlike the US, thus 
heightening their market power.6  By attempting to build a space program from 
unmanned spacecraft to independent space station to lunar lander in the span of just 
three decades (it is anticipated that the real tie-breaking milestone will be a Chinese-
crewed lunar landing scheduled for 20367), China has the potential to access, research, 
and discover more about our celestial neighbors—and beyond—than the US may have 
done in its entire space history. 
 This contrast comes even as the ISS, the American-led, internationally-
cooperative orbital research bastion, faces an imminent retirement.  The ISS, which has 
been in some form of low Earth orbit—albeit with renovations—since 1998, will need 
reexamining for its continued use past the end of the current decade.8  With no 
immediate successor in the works (be it commercial or otherwise), NASA may find itself 
“with no place for its astronauts to go,”9 a moment of grave pause to American low-
gravity research and one which would likely result in layoffs akin to the nearly 9,000 jobs 
lost at the closure of the space shuttle program.10  Ending the shuttle program without 
an immediate stand-in created a one-sided reliance on Russian “Soyuz” rockets, our only 
transport to the ISS for nearly a decade until the first manned SpaceX “Dragon” launch 
                                                     
6 R. Lincoln Hines, “Is China catching up to the United States in space?,” The Washington Post, April 24, 
2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/24/is-china-catching-up-united-states-space/. 
7 “Competing in Space,” National Air and Space Intelligence Center, December 2018, 
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/16/2002080386/-1/-1/1/190115-F-NV711-0002.PDF. 
8 Christian Davenport, “The International Space Station can’t stay up there forever. Will privately run, 
commercial replacements be ready in time?,” The Washington Post, December 23, 2020, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/12/23/space-station-replace-biden/. 
9 Davenport, “The International Space Station can’t stay up there forever. Will privately run, commercial 
replacements be ready in time?”. 




in May of 2020 from Cape Canaveral, tying direct commercial interests to manned 
spaceflight for the first time.11  Recognizing this, Artemis will be an important next step 
in maintaining NASA’s zero-gravity real estate. 
Should the ISS go offline without an American-partnered replacement or 
subsequent mission, we may again find ourselves forfeiting a realm of research to an 
anticipated Chinese-led substitute, one in which the US would be barred, under the 
“Wolf Amendment” to the NASA authorization bill, from participating.12  This 
amendment, which was first introduced in 2011, prevents any NASA-appropriated funds 
from being spent on cooperative programs with China without “specific exception” from 
the FBI, principally in an effort to prevent theft of intellectual property or otherwise 
sensitive information.13 
 Under this consideration, our space-bound initiatives are likely to remain in 
competition, rather than cooperation, with China, a power structure which will 
inevitably rely more heavily on federal spending and on investments in American-led 
innovation.  But even though American space programming entertains record-high 
public support 50 years on from the first Moon landing (64% of a Gallup poll’s 
respondents indicated “the U.S. space program's costs are justifiable” in 2019),14 the 
December 2020 omnibus bill maintained “status quo” NASA spending, withholding a 
                                                     
11 Geoff Brumfiel, “NASA And SpaceX Launch 1st Astronauts To Orbit From U.S. Since 2011,” NPR, May 30, 
2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/05/30/864514995/spacex-and-nasa-try-once-more-to-launch-
astronauts. 
12 Jacqueline Feldscher, “Biden space advisers urge cooperation with China,” Politico, December 20, 2020, 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/20/biden-china-space-448529. 
13 Feldscher. 




significant request by the previous administration for funding the human landing system 
included in the Artemis plans.15  The lander’s $3.1 billion bill, which was largely a result 
of the accelerated timetable of returning to the Moon in 2024, was instead met with 
$850 million.16 
III. HISTORY/BACKROUND 
 Much like the current decade, NASA was created out of a competitive 
environment.  What had originally existed as the National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics was absorbed by and transformed into NASA by President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower in 1958 with the express purpose of facilitating Earth-to-space flight 
research.17  This was, of course, borne of the power struggle to “demonstrate 
technological superiority in space” in the face of Soviet efforts to the same end.18  
Absorbing military-led research facilities in its earliest months, NASA was launched as 
the civilian agency tasked with presenting the faultless image of American innovation in 





                                                     
15 “Massive 2021 U.S. spending bill leaves research advocates hoping for more,” Science, December 22, 
2020, https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/12/massive-2021-us-spending-bill-leaves-research-
advocates-hoping-more. 
16 “Massive 2021 U.S. spending bill leaves research advocates hoping for more.” 





Launching the NASA Image 
 By 1961, President John F. Kennedy had famously challenged the agency to an 
end-of-decade “moonshot” goal, and the United States’ first orbital flight followed with 
John Glenn’s launch in 1962, an effort to match Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin’s flight 
the year prior.19  Despite a deadly 1968 command module fire during Apollo 1 preflight 
ground testing that killed three astronauts,20 Americans touched down in the Sea of 
Tranquility on July 20, 1969, meeting the martyred Kennedy’s original challenge with 
months to spare.  The Apollo missions, six of which landed humans on the Moon, were 
as scientific as they were popular; these Moon-
bound journeys fulfilled (or, better yet, began) 
NASA research into an array of studies on lunar 
soil, on magnetic fields, and on solar winds, 
among other topic areas.21 
                                                     
19 Dick. 
20 Sarah Larimer, “‘We have a fire in the cockpit!’ The Apollo 1 disaster 50 years later.,” The Washington 
Post, January 26, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/speaking-of-science/wp/2017/01/26/50-
years-ago-three-astronauts-died-in-the-apollo-1-fire/. 
21 “The Apollo Program,” Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, accessed February 22, 2020, 
https://airandspace.si.edu/explore-and-learn/topics/apollo/apollo-program/. 
Figure 1 – “On  July 16, 1969, the huge, 363-
feet tall Saturn V rocket launches the Apollo 
11 mission from Pad A, Launch Complex 39, 
Kennedy Space Center, at 9:32 a.m. EDT.” 
Image credit: NASA. 
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 But, as mentioned earlier, the Apollo missions and the federal agency which 
designed, launched, and brought them home were not structured around research 
alone.  These scientific breakthroughs were funded predominantly in an effort to 
showcase American ingenuity and leadership in the face of Cold War pressure, and the 
Apollo program’s immediate non-scientific results were proof positive of its success.  
Within weeks of their return, Apollo 11 astronauts were delivered on a 24-country 
“goodwill tour” over 38 days, newfound diplomatic assets for the United States as tens 
of millions of people showed out to celebrate the Moon landing.22  Later statements 
from the astronauts echoed 
an important sentiment that 
was key to completing this 
aspect of the mission: the 
individuals attending the 
stops on their tour saw a 
direct link between these 
American men (and the 
NASA personnel who delivered them to the Moon) and an accomplishment for all of 
humanity.23  The transformation from niche government research agency to 
international gold medalist was complete. 
                                                     
22 John Uri, “50 Years Ago: Apollo 11 Astronauts Return from Around the World Goodwill Tour,” National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, November 5, 2019, https://www.nasa.gov/feature/50-years-ago-
apollo-11-astronauts-return-from-around-the-world-goodwill-tour. 
23 Uri.  
Figure 2 – “Children along the motorcade route in Bonn [West Germany] 
dressed as astronauts.” Image credit: NASA. 
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 In 1974, on the heels of the then-dissolved Apollo program and amid a 
corporate-sector renaissance of 1920s modernism, NASA was given the go-ahead to call 
for proposals to reformulate its visual identity through the National Endowment for the 
Arts’ “Federal Design Improvement Program.”24  The winning bid by Danne & Blackburn 
was developed to unify the agency, which operated under eleven different centers, and 
introduced the now-iconic “worm” logo in the process.  When the official “Graphics 
Standard Manual” document was issued, then-Administrator James C. Fletcher wrote in 
the introduction: “I think the new logotype is pleasing to the eye and gives a feeling of 
unity, technological precision, thrust and orientation toward the future.  Unity, 
technology, pioneering achievement—that’s what NASA is all about.”25 Though the 
“worm” logo and its 
accompanying standards 
manual would be 
(somewhat vengefully) 
retired in the 1990s, the 
document and visual 
identity that followed—
from building signage to 
satellites which still orbit 
                                                     
24 Christopher Bonanos, “Are you Team Meatball, or Team Worm?,” in 1975 NASA Graphics Standards 
Manual, Richard Danne and Bruce Blackburn (New York: Standards Manual, 2020). 
25 James C. Fletcher, “Letter from James C. Fletcher,” in 1975 NASA Graphics Standards Manual, Richard 
Danne and Bruce Blackburn (New York: Standards Manual, 2020). 
Figure 3 – NASA's 1975 "Graphics Standards Manual" reimagined everything 




Earth today—remain a cleverly progressive embodiment of NASA’s dual roles as both 
federal-level research mainstay and international public relations effort (and noticeably 
reappeared again in 2020 on the Crew Dragon launch). 
Cost and Commercialization 
 In the modern era, NASA budget requests remain generally stagnant across 
administrations.  Though the passing of time trends toward increased expenditures but 
a smaller percentage of the federal budget, presidential administrations from both 
parties and their congressional counterparts have largely continued to fund NASA’s 
expenses with little change, particularly over the last two decades (with the exception of 
the Shuttle program closure in 2011, which lowered NASA’s budget noticeably in the 
few years after, and the previous administration’s efforts to defund earth science 
Table 1 – NASA budgets have fluctuated, but Congress largely tends to continue funding the agency over time. 
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research, most visible in FY201926).  As evidenced by the heightened spending requests 
in recent years, new research and launch programs like the Artemis missions will require 
advanced spending.  This expense, though a minimal percentage of the total federal 
budget, becomes harder to justify when the return on investment is several years 
away—and, to an extent, has little tangible effect on American’s everyday lives. 
In 2012, SpaceX became the first private company to successfully dock at the ISS, 
marking a major step toward significant cost reductions to NASA’s operations—or, at 
least, the ability to stretch federal funding farther per dollar.  This commercialization 
continued into 2014, when NASA awarded two contracts to “ferry” astronauts to the 
ISS, selecting Boeing and SpaceX to return human spaceflight to American soil.27  By last 
year, the Soyuz rockets which had been used since the end of the shuttle program had 
reached a soaring cost of $90 million per seat, paid to Russia, a tab which had continued 
rising significantly.28  At the time of the first crewed SpaceX mission in Florida in 2020, it 
was estimated that these new “Dragon” launches cost $55 million per seat, nearly 
cutting this expense in half.29  This highly publicized launch, at the onset of the COVID-
19 pandemic, was historic in more ways than one, but the cost savings alone helped 
                                                     
26 Ethan Siegel, “Trump's Plan To Destroy NASA Science Laid Bare In FY2020 Budget,” Forbes, March 12, 
2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswithabang/2019/03/12/trumps-plan-to-destroy-nasa-science-
laid-bare-in-fy2020-budget/?sh=3cbe1f3f5818. 
27 Christian Davenport, “NASA awards space contracts to Boeing and SpaceX,” The Washington Post, 
September 16, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/09/16/nasa-awards-
space-contract-to-boeing-and-spacex/. 
28 Davenport, “NASA awards space contracts to Boeing and SpaceX.” 
29 Michael Sheetz, “Why the first SpaceX astronaut launch marks a crucial leap for NASA’s ambitions,” 






mark the new commercial era of American spaceflight and visually unlocked the 
potential for missions like Artemis to reach the Moon—and beyond—without 
impossible increases in budget. 
 While most modern presidencies have often delivered renewed space platforms 
that were never fully realized, at least in the short term, the previous administration’s 
efforts to fast-track their initial Moon-bound mission from 2028 to 2024 left NASA 
“scrambling” to restructure for their new target30—and Congress all but ignoring the 
financial need required of such a pace.31  Former NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine 
was largely successful in securing bipartisan (and international) support for Artemis, 
meaning the project is viewed favorably and seen as an important apolitical mission for 
the agency,32 but missing funding and confusion about mission progress at the end of 
his tenure is evidence of the hesitancy the new timeline has created (scheduled 
technology tests have continued, however, into 2021).  Though total financial estimates 
for the two timelines were comparable, the abbreviated 2024 plan required a significant 
immediate expense of nearly $4 billion in FY2021, a staggering investment against the 
2028 plan’s $1.5 billion estimated expense for the same year.33 
                                                     
30 Christian Davenport, “NASA is scrambling to meet the White House mandate to return astronauts to the 
moon by 2024,” The Washington Post, April 1, 2019, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/04/01/nasa-is-scrambling-meet-white-house-
mandate-return-astronauts-moon-by/?itid=lk_inline_manual_4. 
31 Christian Davenport, “Trump pushed for a moon landing in 2024. It’s not going to happen.,” The 
Washington Post, January 13, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01/13/trump-
nasa-moon-2024/. 
32 Davenport, “Trump pushed for a moon landing in 2024. It’s not going to happen.” 
33 “Artemis Plan: NASA’s Lunar Exploration Program Overview.” 
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Artemis will mark the end of a nearly 50-year gap since the United States’ last 
Moon mission touched down in 1972, engaging both the vast technological 
advancements developed in the decades since the Apollo program and the financial 
advantages of NASA’s new commercial partnerships (including more than just rockets34) 
to accomplish this goal.  This combination is expected to provide heightened economic 
sustainability, increased safety for American astronauts, and continued US-led research 
into the Moon and beyond—a critical presence in the face of a fresh space race, this 
time with China.35 
China Enters Our Orbit 
After that last American lunar landing, it would be another 30 years before China 
reached orbit in a manned spacecraft.36  But since doing so in 2003, China’s space 
program has progressed rapidly.  They completed a spacewalk in 2008, constructed a 
docking space lab in 2011, and delivered several unmanned missions and probes to the 
Moon between 2013 and 2020, one of which marked the first time any country has 
landed on the Moon’s “dark side.”37 In the last year, China also completed their Beidou 
satellite system, a “navigation network” intended to rival the American-led GPS.38 This is 
one of the most recent developments in a slew of largely military-based motivations for 
                                                     
34 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “NASA Names Companies to Develop Human Landers 
for Artemis Moon Missions,” News release, April 30, 2020, https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-
names-companies-to-develop-human-landers-for-artemis-moon-missions. 
35 William J. Broad, “How Space Became the Next ‘Great Power’ Contest Between the U.S. and China,” The 
New York Times, January 24, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/24/us/politics/trump-biden-
pentagon-space-missiles-satellite.html?searchResultPosition=12. 
36 “Timeline: Major milestones in Chinese space exploration,” Reuters, December 1, 2020, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-space-exploration-china-moon-timeline/timeline-major-milestones-
in-chinese-space-exploration-idUSKBN28B5GE. 
37 “Timeline: Major milestones in Chinese space exploration.” 
38 “Timeline: Major milestones in Chinese space exploration.” 
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China’s pursuing space programs; it put everyone 
on alarm in 2007 by testing anti-satellite 
technology on a defunct satellite, blasting 
150,000 “whirling shards” into orbit from the 
impact of the blunt projectile—and putting other 
satellites and the ISS in danger from the debris.39 
 This is where the ‘new NASA’ comes in.  In 
the coded way the United States could flex its 
launch capabilities by experimenting with rockets 
and satellites in the Cold War under the guise of a 
civilian agency, the second-term Obama 
Administration was able to respond to these 
increasing Chinese moves with adaptations to the innovation afforded by NASA’s 
growing list of commercial partners.40  New launch competencies like the reusable 
booster of SpaceX’s “Falcon 9” rocket (which successfully launched for the second time 
on the same booster in 2017 by hoisting a telecommunications satellite into orbit41) 
allow for fast US-based launches and a new level of affordability—traits expected to be 
particularly critical in potential military applications.42  This and other fast-progressing 
American space technologies, developed initially for the civilian NASA’s research-based 
                                                     
39 Broad. 
40 Broad. 
41 Kenneth Chang, “Recycled Rockets Could Drop Costs, Speed Space Travel,” The New York Times, March 
30, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/science/space-x-reuseable-rockets-launch.html. 
42 Broad. 
Figure 4 – "A SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket with the 
company's Crew Dragon spacecraft onboard is 
seen on the launch pad at Launch Complex 39A 
as preparations continue for the Crew-1 
mission, Saturday, Nov. 14, 2020," the first 
mission with four crew members on board. 
Image credit: NASA. 
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applications, ISS missions, and, next, Artemis, have become an increasingly invaluable 
resource for maintaining American dominance in both sectors (that is, the military and 
civilian worlds).  Future investment in programs like Artemis, a top-to-bottom 
collaboration of federal and private dollars, will be required for maintaining such a lead 
and such security—a relationship with the potential to beat NASA at its own game. 
IV. POLICY PROPOSAL 
Proposal Goal & Policy Method 
The goal of this policy is to provide realistic, timeline- and technology-based 
support for the Artemis missions to ensure NASA can follow through on its growing 
commercial and international partnerships and maintain an important hegemony in 
space—all without massive year-over-year cost increases that threaten Artemis’ 
congressional survival.  This policy will be implemented via the administration’s first 
budget request to Congress (FY 2022), measured by its ability to complete the mission 
by the revised timeline.  This follows on the upward trajectory of increases in NASA’s 
budget allocations in recent years while eliminating the ‘sticker shock’ of the previous 
administration’s expedited 2024 goals.  As demonstrated in Table 2, featured in the 
“Artemis Plan,” NASA was forced to justify the accelerated timeline by planning to 
maintain the same overall cost but with the assumption that the initial spike (and all 
subsequent expenses) would largely disappear by FY 2026.43  This assumption—without 
much certainty—was largely unanswered by Congress, lending itself to serious 
                                                     
43 “Artemis Plan: NASA’s Lunar Exploration Program Overview,” National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, September, 2020, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-10/55699-CBO-MBR.pdf. 
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reevaluation in the first budget request of this administration.  The Space Launch 
System (SLS) rocket core, for example, NASA’s Boeing-contracted method of reaching 
the Moon, is already under scrutiny for delays and budget overruns, but it reached the 
“hot-fire” testing stage on January 16 of this year,44 an important progress indicator that 
helps justify its continuation.  Though the funding required of this proposal would, as 
always, be implemented by Congress, utilizing the president’s budget as a policy tool 
assists in demonstrating administration support for NASA’s newest mission (and 
scientific discovery more broadly) while reinforcing an awareness of cost and 
technological need. 
                                                     
44 Valerie Buckingham, Kathryn Hambleton, Tracy McMahan, “NASA Conducts Test of SLS Rocket Core 
Stage for Artemis I Moon Mission,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration, January 16, 2021, 
https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-conducts-test-of-sls-rocket-core-stage-for-artemis-i-moon-
mission. 
Table 2 – In the “Artemis Plan” (2020), NASA’s previous leadership used this graph to justify the initial cost increases 
of the accelerated timeline: “Artemis Phase 1 funding requirements represent a more efficient and direct plan than 
NASA’s previous concept of the 2028 landing. While the funding requirements are accelerated and near-term 
amounts have comparatively increased, overall funding requirements for the 2024 Phase 1 effort are not higher and 
sustained lunar presence and future exploration are accelerated.” Table credit: NASA. 
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Proposal Cost & Timeline 
 This request will be delivered with the administration’s FY 2022 budget (in spring 
of this year) at an initial line-item cost of $5.4 billion for “Deep Space Exploration 
Systems,” which returns funding for the Moon mission and completion of the SLS to 
original estimates at the start of the program (for reference, see NASA’s original FY 2020 
request45 from before the timeline amendment).  It should be noted that this expense is 
nearly halved from the budget request provided by the previous administration, which 
estimated nearly $10.3 billion for the same line item in 2022 based on the new 
timeline.46  It is proposed to be implemented so soon as a result of the ongoing Artemis 
mission work and the general necessity of including NASA funding in the 
administration’s first budget, regardless of support for Artemis. 
The SLS plan was unveiled in 2011 (replacing the Bush-era Constellation 
program, which was canceled to much congressional ire in 201047) and developed as a 
heavy-lift rocket to deliver the thrust capabilities required of the nearly 240,000 mile 
journey to the Moon.  Small-journey projects like SpaceX’s Falcon 9 may be successful, 
but the lengthy Moon trip (nearly 1000 times that of distance to the ISS) requires a 
“monster rocket,”48 and NASA maintains hope that the first successful (unmanned) 
launch may come later this year or early next, one decade after its initial introduction.  
                                                     
45 “FY 2020 Full Budget Request (Congressional Justification),” National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, March 11, 2019, https://www.nasa.gov/content/fy-2020-budget-request. 
46 “FY 2021 Full Budget Request (Congressional Justification),” National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, February 10, 2020, https://www.nasa.gov/news/budget/index.html. 





Following this initial “Artemis I” launch—even with the denied budget requests of the 
previous administration—appropriate next steps can be taken to build on its successes 
or failures in due time, leading to the first crewed mission around the Moon (Artemis II) 
in late 2023 or shortly after, on schedule with the original timeline and on board the 
world’s most powerful rocket ever. 
Policy Authorizing/Authorization Tool 
 The primary effort of this proposal is to use the presidential budget as a starting 
block for supporting a thorough, renewed space exploration policy.  Even still, this policy 
could be rolled out as an interesting mix of traditional authorization methods. While 
largely based on carrot-style targeted federal funding, there also remain several 
opportunities for sermon-style public behavioral shifts to influence greater 
congressional favor for space spending, building on public support for space programs 
and the reemergence of space travel in popular culture in recent years. 
V. POLICY ANALYSIS 
The policy expense of big-budget scientific investment like Artemis can be 
viewed largely from the perspective of opportunity cost.  And while the product of these 
investments requires nearly a decade of development, the expense is immediate.  This is 
universal whether operating on the 2024 or 2028 goal, but the likelihood of the 
program’s success for both financial and technological reasons is significantly more 
varied between the two—though conceding to the slower timeline does not mean a loss 





A significant (and perhaps primary) advantage to the policy of returning Artemis 
to the original 2028 lunar goal is that it allows for technological maturation.  As 
mentioned in Section II, even “The Artemis Plan” itself, the official agency overview of 
the 2024 timeline, notes that NASA’s Human Exploration and Operations Mission 
Directorate assessed the status of the revised program as relying heavily on technology 
keeping pace with the new goal.49  NASA works to 
judge mission success based on technology 
readiness level (TRL), and this early report left 
uncertainty about the “high TRL systems” that will 
be required for Artemis II and III, the manned 
missions around the Moon and to the Moon’s 
surface, respectively.50  By reducing the 
technological stress on NASA teams and their 
commercial partners, the 2028 timeline helps to 
build on the advancements of recent years while 
allowing for the proper development and 
evolution of what is yet to be completed, setting 
up the mission for success rather than (very 
                                                     
49 “Artemis Plan: NASA’s Lunar Exploration Program Overview.” 
50 “Artemis Plan: NASA’s Lunar Exploration Program Overview.” 
Figure 5 – NASA utilizes a Technology 
Readiness Scale (TRL) to determine whether 
available or upcoming technology will 
support mission success. Chart credit: NASA. 
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public) failure due to unmet goals and a large, expedited research tab. 
Secondly, continuing the Artemis mission sets the United States up for a lunar 
presence should China complete its 2030s lunar goal.  When the Chinese landed their 
first Yutu rover on the lunar surface in late 2013, they ended the international lunar 
exploration gap, with deep space investigations having ceased—even for robotic 
missions—in 1976.51  But with their most significant and recent mission to the Moon’s 
far side in 2019, their deep space infrastructure became increasingly complex by 
utilizing a lunar satellite to relay data from the Yutu 2 rover, which would have been 
otherwise blocked by the Moon itself.52  In a way, this system represents a simplified 
model of Artemis’ structure, where a Moon-orbiting gateway serves as a docking base 
to support trips to and from the lunar surface, serving as an intermediary between Earth 
and Moon.  It is not science fiction, then, to posture that China could produce and 
deploy a human lander (and perhaps even a “gateway” of their own) in the near future, 
utilizing the complex technological capabilities of the 21st century to build a more 
permanent human lunar presence than was possible in our Apollo days—and on a far 
shorter timeline.  With Artemis, even on the 2028 timeline, the United States enables 
itself to develop a permanent lunar presence ahead of any Chinese accomplishments to 
the same end.  They—or any other able country—may put their citizens on the surface, 
but the United States would be there to welcome them, providing a reasonable amount 
                                                     
51 Colin Stuart, “Race to the Moon: Inside China’s plans to build a lunar base,” Science Focus, November 




of accountability for any actions taken on the lunar surface as dictated by international 
treaty. 
 Economically, space programs are often seen as jobs-creating policies, and 
Artemis is no different.  Artemis-supporting NASA centers maintain a physical footprint 
in 12 states to supplement every stage of the mission from wind-tunnel testing to 
human-critical technologies like exploration spacesuit development.53  Beyond these 
sites, NASA’s partner corporations in Aerojet Rocketdyne, Boeing, Jacobs, Lockheed 
Martin, and Northrop Grumman are supported by “over 3,800 suppliers contributing to 
Orion, the SLS rocket, and the lunar spaceport at Kennedy.”54  This brings the national 
footprint of supporting companies—from small businesses to market leaders—to nearly 
all of the 50 states, a staggeringly long list of companies when viewed in print.  NASA’s 
own reports suggest the 
ongoing “Moon to Mars 
initiative” (which includes 
Artemis) “supports more 
than 69,000 jobs, $14 billion 
in economic output, and $1.5 
billion in tax revenue” in 
FY2019,55 a significantly efficient payout that accounts for just 22% of NASA’s broader 
                                                     
53 “Artemis Plan: NASA’s Lunar Exploration Program Overview.” 
54 “Artemis Partners,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration, August 20, 2020, 
https://www.nasa.gov/content/artemis-partners. 
55 Bettina Inclán, Matthew Rydin, Karen Northon, “NASA Report Details How Agency Significantly Benefits 
US Economy,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration, September 25, 2020, 
https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-report-details-how-agency-significantly-benefits-us-economy. 
Figure 6 – Each pin represents one company supporting any of NASA’s 
“Prime Contractor” partner corporations across all aspects of Artemis 
development. Image credit: NASA/Google Maps. 
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economic output.  From this position, it may be particularly appealing to engage a policy 
with roots in so many communities across the country, which will be addressed further 
in Section VI.  But by facilitating this economic impact, NASA is also able to use Artemis 
as a method for helping regulate the rising commercial space industry and create 
mission-derived jobs, rather than allowing the industry to evolve without any ability for 
federal government oversight. 
 An additional positive that carries forward from the buildup to the Artemis 
program is the reintroduction of the National Space Council in 2017.  While the Council 
has its detractors and has only functioned in an on-again-off-again capacity since 
Kennedy, the ability of a directed effort like Artemis is expected to function better—and 
perhaps see completion—under guidance from within the administration.  By bringing 
back the National Space Council in the Artemis era, George Washington University space 
policy expert John Logsdon sees the benefits of this oversight in the face of a still-murky 
space policy: “if there is to be a national strategy for space, it must come from the 
center of government.”56 
Disadvantages 
 On balance, reintroducing the National Space Council as part of the Artemis 
platform could prove troublesome.  Some of the Council’s strongest detractors in 
previous administrations were NASA leaders themselves, many of whom saw the body 
as added bureaucratic oversight on top of the “already convoluted endeavor” of a space 
                                                     





program57 or even that it came between senior NASA leadership and their presidents.58  
Notably missing from the revived Council under the previous administration were 
figureheads from the newest commercial space names, like Elon Musk, whose own 
rockets would deliver American astronauts to space just under three years after the 
initial Council announcement.  The trade association for this startup-heavy industry, the 
Commercial Spaceflight Federation, responded with a simple tweet to the 2017 
announcement, noting it was “encouraged” but also hoping “the innovation and value 
of commercial space is adequately represented on council.”59  The Commercial 
Spaceflight Federation represents at least two of NASA’s Artemis landing system 
partners in Jeff Bezos’ Blue Origin and Musk’s SpaceX.60  Adding to the complexities of 
our newfound public-private space era, analysts also suggest the Council is most 
burdensome “under presidents and vice presidents who have little interest in space.”61  
Citing space historian and National Research Council program officer Dwayne Day, The 
Atlantic staff writer Marina Koren notes that for the council to be effective, “the 
decision-makers have to actually want its advice.” 
 A primary disadvantage of continuing the Artemis program, above the 
bureaucratic, is the tremendous cost, even on the 2028 timeline.  Though miniscule 
                                                     
57 Kaplan. 
58 Marina Koren, “The History Behind the Long-Dead Space Council Trump Wants to Revive,” The Atlantic, 
March 24, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/03/national-space-council-donald-
trump/520725/. 
59 Commercial Spaceflight Federation (@csf_spaceflight), “Encouraged to see WH est. space council today. 
Hope the innovation and value of commercial space is adequately represented on council,” Twitter, June 
30, 2017, https://twitter.com/csf_spaceflight/status/880876389037158401. 




when compared to the approximately $283 billion (in today’s dollars) spent on Apollo, 
NASA’s estimates from last year still count Artemis program expenses at $28 billion 
through completion.62  Yes, this proposal lessens the year-to-year financial burden of 
Artemis, but it still requires an increase in NASA spending from scarce and competitive 
tax payer dollars.  For context, one year of a domestic social service program like the 
National School Lunch Program, which feeds 29.4 million children every day, costs $14.1 
billion,63 a program with a significant and daily impact that can outshine the less-than-
universal image of a dozen individuals visiting the Moon for double the cost.  In the face 
of looming post-pandemic stimulus expenditures and large-scale administration 
spending goals on domestic fixes like infrastructure, the cost increases required of even 
such a small percentage of the federal budget can seem superfluous, begging the 
question: when there is much to fix at home, should we start looking for a new one 
hundreds of thousands of miles away? 
Finally, viewing the Artemis program as a method for competitive advantage, as 
this proposal suggests, has a potentially permanent drawback.  As University of 
Massachusetts Amherst professor Paul Musgrave notes bluntly for Foreign Policy, “The 
moonshot was always a myth.”64  The idea that built NASA’s previously mentioned 
function as the nation’s public relations arm of humanitarian discovery was really, even 
                                                     
62 Jamie Carter, “8 Reasons Why NASA’s $28 Billion Moon Return Is The Bargain Of The Century,” Forbes, 
September 23, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamiecartereurope/2020/09/23/8-reasons-why-
nasas-28-billion-moon-return-is-the-bargain-of-the-century/?sh=c36eb2a3b242. 
63 “National School Lunch Program,” United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, 
October 1, 2020, https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-nutrition-assistance/child-nutrition-
programs/national-school-lunch-program. 




to Kennedy, an expensive way 
to prove ourselves against the 
Soviet Union and communism 
more broadly.  With space 
now playing a constant—if 
invisible—role in our daily 
lives, the competition is not 
so easily defined as the 
United States versus China, 
and who accomplishes a task first.  The benchmark moves daily, based on our industrial 
and defense needs.  To expect that public support for this expense (returning to the 
Moon) will come from the need to beat the Chinese over doing it for “climate change, 
asteroid defense, and scientific research” is poor judgement.65  Committing to this new 
lunar race means potentially repeating the opportunity cost mistakes of the Apollo era; 
at the expense of sending Americans to the Moon, true humanitarian accomplishments 
(to use Musgrave’s examples: “desalination or curing cancer”66) were left unsolved. 
VI. POLITICAL ANALYSIS 
While the role NASA occupied in the foundational decades described in 
preceding sections was inherently a political one, NASA’s now-cemented roots in 
creating a kind of space-industrial complex have further tied the agency’s necessity to 
                                                     
65 Musgrave. 
66 Musgrave. 
Figure 7 – Astronaut John Glenn Jr. speaks after being honored by 
President John F. Kennedy following Glenn's historic three-orbit flight, 
Mercury-Atlas 6. Image credit: NASA. 
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our political futures, and the intranational nature of the Artemis program is a fitting 
example of its far-reaching implications in the political arena.  While the Biden 
administration has voiced its intention to support Artemis, it has not confirmed the 
mission timeline, either with revisions or as set by the previous administration.67 
Advantages 
 As in any significant government investment in the modern era, one word has 
greater political weight than few others: jobs.  When the Obama administration 
unveiled a NASA program rewrite in 2010 that canceled an Artemis-like mission via the 
Constellation rocket, significant uproar rattled the decision and forced a fast-paced 
replacement, led mostly by congressional leaders from Texas and Florida (whose 
districts’ employers include NASA centers and their myriad contractors) but also by 
those from within the NASA community, including household names like Neil 
Armstrong, who called the cancellation “poorly advised,” among other remarks.68  The 
revision (the Space Launch System described in Section IV) came one year later, largely 
at the request of the frustrated congresspeople and answering their main call to save 
jobs, but it introduced new goals that both revived some projects (the Orion capsule, 
                                                     
67 Paul Rincon, “Artemis: Biden administration backs US Moon shot,” BBC News, February 5, 2021, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-55949250. 




which is still featured in the SLS used for Artemis) and altogether 
surpassed others (an asteroid landing or orbiting Mars, for 
example).69  In the end, this compromise on NASA’s departure from 
one project and strikingly-familiar transition to another held onto the 
jobs that have further linked NASA’s success to that of our national 
economy while opening the door for its greatest cost-saving measure 
yet: commercialization. 
 To project this lesson onto Artemis, it would create an 
unnecessary congressional showdown to cancel Artemis at this stage 
of the project.  With astronaut candidates named,70 the long-term 
goals of SLS71 reaching successful final tests,72 and deep space 
commercial rockets still blowing up at various stages of launch,73 
there is reason to believe the Artemis mission may actually be NASA’s 
next—if not last—successful homegrown rocket mission.  By 
working to see Artemis through to a successful completion 
without the burdened 2024 goal, the administration can find a 
                                                     
69 Pete Spotts, “Despite uproar, Obama holds firm on NASA space exploration plans,” The Christian 
Science Monitor, April 14, 2010,  
70 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “NASA Names Artemis Team of Astronauts Eligible for 
Early Moon Missions,” News release, December 9, 2020, https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-
names-artemis-team-of-astronauts-eligible-for-early-moon-missions. 
71 Rand Simberg, “NASA's Space Launch System Unveiled: Analysis,” Popular Mechanics, September 14, 
2011, https://www.popularmechanics.com/space/a11833/nasas-space-launch-system-unveiled-analysis-
6432937/. 
72 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “NASA Mega Moon Rocket Passes Key Test, Readies for 
Launch,” News release, March 18, 2021, https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-mega-moon-rocket-
passes-key-test-readies-for-launch. 
73 William Harwood, “Another SpaceX Starship prototype lost in test flight explosion,” CBS News, March 
31, 2021, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/spacex-starship-prototype-explosion-test-flight/. 
Figure 8 – This configuration of 
the SLS, with the Exploration 
Upper Stage, will provide in-
space propulsion to send 
astronauts in NASA’s Orion 
spacecraft and heavy cargo on 
a precise trajectory to the 
Moon. Image credit: NASA. 
 
     
      
    
    
    
     
     
    
 
     
      
    
    
    
    
      
     
      
   
    
 
 27 
new outlet for supporting both its campaign and post-election promises of building up 
American manufacturing jobs, small businesses, and cutting edge science alike, perhaps 
one of the few policy opportunities that allows such a combination.  And if NASA, via 
“Moon to Mars,” can tout the staggering number of an ongoing 69,000 jobs, it would 
seem, to paraphrase Armstrong from a decade ago, ill advised to cut it. 
In the Senate, 11 Democratic leaders (including new Senate Commerce 
subcommittee head for science and space John Hickenlooper) in February wrote the 
administration urging for the continued funding of the lunar lander required of the 
Artemis program, citing opportunities for “important international collaboration and 
healthy competition,” calling China by name.74  These senators see the bipartisan 
possibilities provided by the success of a multi-presidency policy like those required in 
Artemis, writing: 
Major space exploration efforts have faced disruption as administrations have 
changed and priorities shifted. It is now time for stability if the nation is to make 
progress on these initiatives. NASA has made significant progress through the 
Artemis Program and we strongly believe that those efforts should continue in 
FY 2022. … We recommend robust funding in FY 2022 for continuation of the 
[Human Landing System] program and the timely selection of companies to 
advance to the next stage of development and demonstration contracts. 
Maintaining competition in this program to the maximum practical extent 
                                                     





encourages innovation, controls costs, and ensures the nation has assured 
access to deep space.75 
For these Senators to provide such clear support for a program embraced by the 
previous administration demonstrates the political opportunities presented within this 
mission, especially for the purpose of creating unifying, high-visibility legislation that can 
coexist with more debate-likely bills on infrastructure and healthcare. 
 This bipartisan future of American space is further elevated by the 
administration’s recent naming of former Senator Bill Nelson as nominee for NASA 
Administrator.76  The former Democratic senator 
from Florida (who lost reelection in 2018), himself 
a former Space Shuttle astronaut (in 1986, flight 
STS 61-C), received swift bipartisan praise 
following the announcement from both unlikely 
sources (Senator Ted Cruz) and his immediate 
predecessor (former Administrator Bridenstine), 
and will bring with him a record of vehement 
support for NASA leadership in space.77  Nelson 
was a proponent of the SLS throughout his final 
years in the Senate,78 indicating a strong 
                                                     
75 Murray et al. 




Figure 9 – The space shuttle Columbia (STS 61-C) 
can still be seen in this distant scene, with Biden-
nominated NASA Administrator Bill Nelson on 
board. The scene was recorded around 7 a.m. 
(EST), Jan. 12, 1986. Image credit: NASA. 
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likelihood he will remain an adamant supporter of seeing the program through.  
Weighing Nelson’s confirmation with the bipartisan calls for Artemis’ continuation, the 
political success of both navigating Congress and placing America’s largest ever rocket in 
lunar orbit would seem worthy goals for this new administration. 
 Finally, public support continues to overwhelmingly value continued space 
exploration.  A Pew Research Center study from 2018, for example, notes that about 
“seven-in-ten Americans (72%) say it is essential for the U.S. to continue to be a world 
leader in space exploration, and eight-in-ten (80%) say the space station has been a 
good investment for the country,” with 65% of respondents noting the importance of 
NASA leadership when compared with that of private corporations (33%).79  
Additionally, 58% of those surveyed noted Astronaut-led missions to space as 
“essential” versus those who did not consider it essential (41%).80 
Disadvantages 
 Despite this momentum, with the recently-announced rollout of the “American 
Jobs Plan” and its $2 trillion investment in the domestic infrastructure required of a 21st 
century economy, continuing an upward trajectory for NASA’s budget year over year 
loses political weight.  As mentioned in Section V, though it remains small in comparison 
to many other facets of our complex national budget, stretching NASA into the mid-$20 
billion spending mark can become a superfluous ask.  Two years of NASA spending at 
                                                     
79 “Majority of Americans Believe It Is Essential That the U.S. Remain a Global Leader in Space,” Pew 
Research Center, June 6, 2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2018/06/06/majority-of-
americans-believe-it-is-essential-that-the-u-s-remain-a-global-leader-in-space/. 
80 “Majority of Americans Believe It Is Essential That the U.S. Remain a Global Leader in Space.” 
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this level is a parallel amount to the $40 billion the American Jobs Plan earmarks for 
public housing infrastructure, for example.81  While Artemis itself is not the entirety of 
NASA’s budget, its price tag remains in the billions of dollars, a leftover priority from the 
previous administration that could threaten legislative spending on new urgencies.  
Moreover, despite significant public support for American leadership in space, the same 
Pew survey results ranked Moon- or Mars-bound missions lower in priority than other 
NASA initiatives, like monitoring climate or developing “technologies that could be 
adapted for other uses,” though all priorities in the survey received a majority of 
responses for “important” or better.82  A Monmouth poll conducted this year with 
similar ranked choice priorities found that respondents want to retain American space 
leadership but are less likely to want additional lunar or Martian travel (33% said 
sending “human astronauts to the moon or Mars should be a ‘top’ or ‘important but 
lower’ priority”).83 
 By answering the spending call of those Democratic senators or even just to 
continue SLS, funding Artemis also gives credence to the idea that American leadership 
is still required in space, that another country’s presence in this still-expanding frontier 
(namely China) is indeed worthy of offsetting, even beating.  This competition, while it 
brings advantages, commits the United States to fighting a conflict which has not yet 
                                                     
81 The White House, “FACT SHEET: The American Jobs Plan,” News release, March 31, 2021, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-american-
jobs-plan/. 
82 “Majority of Americans Believe It Is Essential That the U.S. Remain a Global Leader in Space.” 
83 Sam Sabin, “Nearly Half the Public Wants the U.S. to Maintain Its Space Dominance. Appetite for Space 




arisen—and without the privacy of hushed conversations at the Pentagon.  It would 
become a potential lasting marker of this administration to see Artemis through its first 
unmanned launch, its expense too great to be unlinked from any administration’s 
priorities—but especially one with big spending goals.  To fund and then launch a series 
of financially burdensome—however technologically advanced—rockets, eventually 
with American souls on board, is not only a domestic marker of accomplishment, but an 
internationally permanent signal of our dedication to sovereignty in space at nearly any 
cost. 
 And this argument—which could be read as a positive or a negative depending 
on the audience—is fraught with symbolism.  Each of our space-bound efforts, including 
the argument presented in this policy, uses space as a proving ground for the American 
experience.  Historical figures as far back as John Quincy Adams have called for 
American astronomical initiatives, questioning how the United States could lag behind 
the European powers-that-be, finding out second-hand information about the cosmos 
while “the earth revolves in perpetual darkness to our unsearching eyes.”84  The idea 
that we might carry forward our American experience was not, of course, limited to 
observing the stars, for it is this same pushing forward which wrought our westward 
expansionist vision of America—at the expense of what remained ‘untouched’ by our 
hand, to the tune of entire native populations and landscapes—that we tend to 
overlook having once been religious refugees or colonial subjects ourselves. 
                                                     




What the previous administration, then, referred to as our “manifest destiny in 
the stars” should not be overlooked when analyzing the political significance of our 
continued exploration beyond the atmosphere.85  Artemis goals can be misconstrued as 
ways of ‘settling’ or ‘colonizing’ celestial objects, risking the repetition of the 
exploitative mindset and language of our frontier era past, particularly at the core of the 
mineral extraction possibilities provided by further exploring our Moon.  NASA’s 
commercial partners, both current and future, can play a role in this.  Jeff Bezos’ Blue 
Origin corporation, for example, a potential Artemis lunar lander contractor, has often 
provided renderings of space-bound communities, usually orbital in nature (as opposed 
to those on planets, like Elon Musk’s Mars 
dreams).  As Marc Miller (an assistant 
professor at the Penn State Landscape 
Architecture Stuckeman School) points out, the 
vision presented by these renderings echoes 
the art created in the 19th century expansion 
into the greater Northeastern United States, 
which “celebrated agriculture and other 
methods of organizing nature to the benefit of 
European colonizers.”86  When Buzz Aldrin 
                                                     
85 Donald J. Trump, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,” (speech, 
Washington, DC, February 4, 2020), U.S. Government Publishing Office, 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202000058/pdf/DCPD-202000058.pdf. 
86 Marc Miller, “Decoding the colonial history behind Blue Origin's space settlements,” The Architect's 
Newspaper, July 19, 2019, https://www.archpaper.com/2019/07/decoding-colonial-history-blue-origin-
space-settlements/. 
Figure 10 – Apollo 17 Mission Commander Eugene A. 
Cernan adjusts the American flag during the final 
Apollo mission in 1972, with Earth in the background. 
Image credit: NASA. 
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planted an American flag in the “dusty lunar rocks” of 1969, this image became a 
reality.87  It would be politically wise to carefully evaluate the darker sides of our new 
race to the Moon and beyond, and to navigate Artemis with a responsible lexicon. 
VII. RECOMMENDATION 
NASA plays a wide-ranging role in regional economies across the country (and 
globe) and has regularly dazzled the public with an increasing number of high-profile 
achievements in the last half decade, from the first contracted commercial flight with 
humans on board in 2020 to the recent broadcasting of the first-ever live video landing 
of a rover on another planet.  With Artemis, NASA has the potential to take humans 
deeper into space than ever before, revisit the lunar surface with an immensely greater 
technological skillset than Apollo missions, and support its small business and corporate 
partners in ongoing developments that continue to reduce the fiscal weight of this and 
forthcoming missions, building a financially sustainable future for Artemis and its 
successors.  And finally, the bipartisan support of Artemis—for multiple stages of the 
mission—presents the opportunity for a congressional success in the face of other 
decidedly difficult legislative priorities.  It is the recommendation of this memorandum 
that the Biden administration continue the Artemis missions with the goal of landing the 
first woman and next man on the moon by 2028.  By continuing the mission, though 
revised, the administration supports the program while preventing the public failure of a 
hard push toward the previous administration’s impossible deadline. 
                                                     




In a way, it is a common misconception that NASA, overshadowed by the 
software giants who have quickly and publicly reached low earth orbit in recent years, is 
a dying agency.  Left for a decade without the continuing press of a mission like the 30-
year shuttle program and unable to always present the sleek—and popular culture—
appeal of its commercial counterparts in recent years, particularly online,88 NASA has 
fallen victim to the transparency provided by the internet, a new era of anxious 
expectation that cannot be assuaged by the symbolic placement of a moonrock in the 
Oval Office alone.89  Millions of Twitter users and Googlers can keep up with the 
repetitive launches of SpaceX rockets and the ongoing “West Texas” testing at Blue 
Origin; they can see and share, more easily than ever, the exact dollar amounts required 
of NASA missions across its entire 
spectrum of research efforts (as 
opposed to the unlisted expenditures of 
private space companies, for example); 
and they can endlessly question a lack 
of instantaneous communication from 
the space agency, like the stream of 
tweets and articles in February that 
probed the perceived delay in releasing 
                                                     
88 Mark Matousek and Avery Hartmans, “Elon Musk tweeted that the Egyptian pyramids were built by 
aliens. Here are 39 of the most outrageous things he's said over the years.,” Insider, August 5, 2020, 
https://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-shocking-quotes-tweets-2018-10. 
89 Miriam Kramer, “What to know about the Moon rock in Biden's Oval Office,” Axios, January 26, 2021, 
https://www.axios.com/moon-rock-oval-office-biden-edc82c0d-0255-4384-81fe-8d5959e104f0.html. 
Figure 11 – NASA catalogue image of the lunar sample 
currently on loan to the Oval Office, originally collected 
in 1972 by Apollo 17. Image credit: NASA. 
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the RAW images of the Martian surface from the Perseverance mission (options include 
that Perseverance must have “exploded” or “NASA is backing down from its historical 
commitment to transparency,” reasoned one article90). 
But this new culture aside, NASA is the very agency fostering the increasingly-
popular commercial developments in Earth orbit (and their potential for future 
applications for national defense), providing the valuable funding contracts and 
payloads required to build a rocket company and the research conducted at the ISS end 
of their journey.  In reality, there is no competition between the agency and commercial 
space, and Artemis affirms this.  Programs like Artemis need commercial partnerships to 
see through the massive scale of mission details like the gateway or the human landing 
system, while commercial partnerships need programs like Artemis to help finance 
ambitious research and development that may, in the near future, replace the need for 
NASA rocket-reliant missions like Artemis.  For now, with no viable commercial 
alternative, continuing Artemis means seeing out NASA’s most powerful rocket, and 
likely for the last time.  As a recent New York Times essay from journalist David W. 
Brown concludes, “Whether the Space Launch System program ends next year or next 
decade, unlike the end of the space shuttle or Saturn 5, it will not be the end of a 
chapter, but the end of a book. NASA will be out of the rocket business.”91 
  
                                                     
90 Tony Tran, “Why Isn’t NASA Releasing RAW Images from Perseverance? We can think of a few reasons 
why.,” Futurism, February 21, 2021, https://futurism.com/nasa-raw-images-perseverance. 





Thomas I. Deaton is a native of Elizabethtown, Kentucky, and maintained residence 
between his hometown and Arlington, Virginia, throughout his completion of this 
program.  He is a 2019 graduate of Western Kentucky University and the Mahurin 
Honors College where he was a recipient of the Cherry Presidential Scholarship and 
received his Bachelor of Arts in English summa cum laude with a minor in environmental 
studies & sustainability.  He is an alumnus of the Semester at Sea program (Fall 2016) 
and a former intern in a division of the United States Office of the Chief of Protocol at 
the US Department of State.  He currently serves as the executive officer of a not-for-
profit industry association in the central Kentucky region and as a freelance creative 
director.  Thomas was born in Louisville, Kentucky, in 1997. 
